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Motoshige Itoh 
4.1  Introduction 
The distribution system in Japan in the post-World War I1 period devel- 
oped quite differently from those in other industrial countries.' One of the 
distinguishing features of the Japanese system is that retail and wholesale 
distribution is dominated by small and medium-size firms and that many 
goods go  through  long tunnels of  wholesalers before they  reach con- 
sumers. 
The distribution  channel policy pursued  by  manufacturers has been 
affected by  this particular characteristic of the distribution system. When 
the retail sector is dominated by small retail stores, wholesalers have great 
influence over what goods are sold in the retail sector. Small retail stores, 
which do not have enough information about goods or the capability to 
procure goods by  themselves, depend heavily on the services of wholesal- 
ers. Because there were many small retail stores, there had to be many 
small wholesalers. It was these small wholesalers that offered advice to 
retail stores and delivered goods in small lots. As a result, distribution 
channels had a vertically segregated structure, in which each category of 
goods went through a different wholesale system; for example, processed 
foods, fresh foods, confectioneries, paper products, dairy products, frozen 
foods, books, liquor, and rice were distributed by  different wholesalers. 
Furthermore, many wholesalers were local firms, and few large wholesal- 
ers covered  the entire national  market.  There were a  large number  of 
wholesalers in Japan. 
Motoshige Itoh is professor of economics at the University of Tokyo. 
1.  See Ito and Maruyama (1991) and Itoh (1991) on the basic structure of the Japanese 
distribution system. 
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Under this structure manufacturers engaged in strengthening their rela- 
tions with wholesalers. Close relations between manufacturers and whole- 
salers were called keiretsu relations in Japanese. A number of measures 
were introduced by manufacturers for developing keiretsu relations. These 
included vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance and closed 
territories,  as well  as various  forms  of  rebate  systems.  Manufacturers 
sometimes even  supplied sales staff to retail stores.* By  these methods 
manufacturers constructed their keiretsu distribution channels. In extreme 
cases, such as home electric appliances and cosmetic goods, manufacturers 
had their own keiretsu retail store chains. 
Several factors were responsible for the particular structure of the Japa- 
nese distribution system. The motorization process was slow in Japan, and 
most consumers went shopping on foot until the mid-1970s. The popula- 
tion was concentrated in urban areas. These factors did not allow large 
retail stores to spread rapidly. At the same time, small retail stores were 
heavily protected by  various  regulations. Under the Large Scale Retail 
Store Law, large retail stores faced high barriers to entry into local mar- 
kets. This law, by retarding the spread of large retail stores, slowed struc- 
tural change in the distribution system. 
The Japanese distribution system had many problems from the view- 
point of competition policy. The distribution channel practices of manu- 
facturers such as the ones mentioned above often imposed high prices on 
consumers. Such products as cosmetic goods, home electric appliances, 
and pharmaceutical  products were  sold under  manufacturer-controlled 
prices in small retail stores. Discounting of these prices by  large retail 
stores was often interrupted by manufacturers. The keiretsu relation estab- 
lished between incumbent manufacturers and wholesalers often became 
an entry barrier to newly introduced manufactured goods including im- 
ported goods. 
Foreign manufacturers as well as foreign retailers who intended to sell 
their products in Japan faced this barrier. The distribution system as a 
barrier  to market  access became  a trade negotiation  issue. It arose in 
Japan-U.S. trade negotiations  in individual product areas such as color 
film and automobiles. The Large Scale Retail Store Law was negotiated 
with the United  States in the Structural Impediment Initiative talks of 
1989-90.  As a result, the Japanese government announced the deregula- 
tion of the retail sector and the reform of the Large Scale Retail Store Law. 
Market access issues have also attracted attention inside Japan. It was 
pointed out by many people that the prices of various goods were much 
higher in Japan than in other countries and that the Japanese distribution 
system was responsible. According to this argument, if  sound arbitrage 
2. Although some of these measures are in violation of antimonopoly law in Japan, the 
law had not been enforced strictly until recently. Manufacturers were also skillful enough to 
apply these measures without violating the law. Competition in the Japanese Distribution Market  141 
mechanisms worked  through  distribution  channels,  the inflow of  low- 
priced goods from abroad would have filled the price gaps. The fact that 
the price gaps were not filled implied that the distribution system was a 
barrier to imports. 
The Japanese distribution system has actually been in the process of 
rapid structural change in the past ten years or so. The deregulation men- 
tioned above has been a driving force behind this change, but other factors 
have also contributed to it. Although motorization in Japan was about 
fifty years behind that in the United  state^,^ the number of cars in Japan 
has increased rapidly since the 1970s. The motorization process has con- 
tributed to an increase in the number of large retail stores and shopping 
centers in the suburbs and to a weakening of traditional shopping areas 
in towns. 
Another important factor causing structural change in the distribution 
system has been an increase in imports, which was triggered by  yen ap- 
preciation. Imports of manufactured  goods have increased in particular; 
the share of manufactured goods in the total imports of Japan increased 
from 30 percent in 1985 to 60 percent in 1995. Import goods often came 
through newly established distribution channels and thus contributed to 
the growth of these new channels. 
The distribution system of Japan is now in the midst of great change. 
Traditional channels and newly emerging channels now coexist. In spite 
of its rapid change, the structure of Japanese distribution is still quite 
different from that in the United States and in other countries. 
The purpose of this paper is to explain how the traditional distribution 
system emerged, to analyze the mechanisms behind the structural change 
in the system, and to consider the implications for competition policy of 
the present changes in the distribution system. I will also discuss the mar- 
ket access issue. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 4.2 explains how the 
traditional distribution channels emerged in Japan and what implications 
the system has for competition. Section 4.3 then discusses the role the 
Large Scale Retail Store Law played in the distribution system. Section 
4.4 then discusses the present structural change in the Japanese distribu- 
tion system and its implications for competition policy. Brief concluding 
remarks are given in section 4.5. 
4.2  Basic Structure of the Traditional Japanese Distribution System 
Table 4.1 shows some of the basic characteristics of the Japanese distri- 
bution system as compared with those in other industrial countries in the 
mid-1980s. The table confirms that, as mentioned in the introduction, one 
3. There was one car for every 5.3 people in the United States in 1930, while there was 
one car for every 7.5 people in Japan in  1973. 142  Motoshige Itoh 
~~~  ~~ 
Table 4.1  Comparison of Distribution Markets among Major Countries 
Countries 
West  United  United 
Japan,  Germany,  States,  France,  Kingdom, 
1985  198S:3  1982  1986:l  1984 
Retailers 
Shop density 
No. of shops per 1,000 km2 
No. of shops per population 
of  10,000 
No. of workers per shop 
Wholesalers 
Shop density 
No. of shops per 1,000 km2 
No. of shops per population 
No. of workers per 1,000 
of  10,000 
retailers 
No. of workers per shop 
















1  Xb 
20s  1,018  1,406 
81  102  61 
7.5  3.9  6.8 
40  290 
16  29 
196  285 
12.6  9.9” 
1.9  1  .@ 
Source: Ministry of  International Trade and Industry (1  988). Data: Annuaire statistique de 
la France, Statistisches Jahrbuch, Retailing Business Monitoc Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, Census of  Business, and Commercial Statistics of MITI. 
a1983. 
1984. 
of the distinguishing characteristics of the traditional Japanese distribu- 
tion system was the dominance of the retail and wholesale sectors by small 
and medium-size firms. In Japan the number  of shop outlets per given 
population was large and the number of workers per  1,000 retailers was 
small. Note that the WIR ratio at the bottom of the table shows the ratio 
of total wholesale transactions to total retail transactions. The high  WI 
R ratio for Japan indicates that there were a large number of wholesale 
transactions before goods reached retail stores. 
One can think of several reasons why the distribution sector was domi- 
nated by small firms. The transport system is a crucial factor in determin- 
ing the shape of the distribution system. Japan lagged behind other indus- 
trial countries in the motorization process, while public transportation, 
such as the railway system, subway system, and bus system, was well devel- 
oped. Japan was also characterized by high population density with most 
of its population in urban regions. Most consumers did their routine shop- 
ping on foot and used the public transportation system for occasional 
shopping in larger shopping areas near a railway station or in the center 
of a large city. Responding to these shopping habits, a large number of Competition in the Japanese Distribution Market  143 
small shopping zones, which consisted of many mom-and-pop stores sell- 
ing such items as drugs, fresh vegetables, fish, and meat emerged near 
residential areas. Larger shopping areas near railway stations or in the 
centers of  large cities sold such products as clothing, jewelry, books, and 
home electric appliances. 
There were also a large number of small wholesalers supporting these 
small retail stores. Most  small retail stores were mom-and-pop stores, 
where family members spent most of their working time in the store serv- 
ing customers. Thus they depended on the services of wholesalers for de- 
livery of products, pricing suggestions, and sometimes even for the display 
of goods in their stores. Without the heavy support of wholesalers, they 
would not have been able to run their stores. 
Most of the wholesalers were also small-the  better to serve small retail 
stores: the type of services small retail stores were seeking could not be 
provided  by  large wholesalers. Just like  small retail stores, most  small 
wholesalers specialized in some category of goods. Thus there were many 
segregated distribution channels, each of which specialized in some cate- 
gory of  product^.^ 
Wholesalers were  classified according not only to categories of goods 
but  also to regions. Although Japan is  a small country geographically, 
most wholesalers were regional and not many were nati~nal.~ 
It is important to realize that the distribution channel policy of manu- 
facturers depended on these characteristics of the Japanese system. Estab- 
lishing close and often exclusive relations with wholesalers was essential 
for manufacturers to have better  control  over  the  retail market,  since 
wholesalers influenced retail  stores in  their product  choices. So-called 
keiretsu distribution channels were set up by manufacturers. 
For wholesalers too it was crucial to establish intimate relations with 
national  manufacturers.  Manufacturers  often  offered  volume  rebate 
schemes under which  wholesalers were  given  rebates  according to  the 
amount they sold.6  Under this rebate system wholesalers had an incentive 
to sell  as much as possible of  one manufacturer’s products rather than 
diversifying their sales effort to several manufacturers. Wholesalers having 
good relations with manufacturers were also treated favorably in the sup- 
ply  of goods. In the period of rapid economic growth of the  1950s and 
4. I once conducted a field study of the distribution channels for local supermarkets (Itoh 
1995). One of the striking features of the wholesale distribution network for supermarkets is 
that each category of product is carried by  a different wholesaler. This contrasts with the 
situation in the United States, where most products are carried to supermarkets by a limited 
number of wholesalers who deal with all kinds of products. 
5. In fact, the wholesale system often was a multilayer system, in which goods were sold 
by  national-level wholesalers to local wholesalers and then by  local wholesalers to local re- 
tail stores. 
6. In table 4.2 below, I give a typical example of a volume rebate system for the case of 
cosmetic goods. 144  Motoshige Itoh 
1960s best-selling products were often scarce and not all wholesalers could 
receive  their  full  orders  of  these  goods.  Manufacturers  discriminated 
among wholesalers according to how close they were to the manufactur- 
ers. This type of intimate relation sometimes went as far as the situation, 
as in the case of beer, where many wholesalers dealt only with a particular 
manufacturer’s products. In Japan, even now, almost no wholesalers deal 
with beer from all four major manufacturers.’ 
This kind of control of distribution channels by  manufacturers some- 
times went as far as exclusive relations between retail stores and manufac- 
turers. Typical cases of control of small retail stores by manufacturers in- 
volved home electric appliances and cosmetics. The largest manufacturer 
of  home electric appliances in Japan,  Matsushita,  organized twenty to 
thirty thousand small retail stores around the nation: the majority of the 
sales in these stores were Matsushita products. Matsushita provided these 
stores with various kinds of support, such as favorable rebates (the amount 
of rebate increases with the store’s sales of Matsushita products), favorable 
supply of products, and other assistance. These stores were called “Mat- 
sushita chain stores” and were located in local shopping areas. The owners 
of  these stores had intimate relations with people in the neighborhood 
through various local activities. During the period when maintenance ser- 
vice  was  important  for  electric appliances people tended  to use  these 
neighborhood  stores, which  they  could  trust.  Other manufacturers  of 
home electric appliances followed marketing approaches similar to Mat- 
sushita’~.~ 
Leading cosmetic manufacturers took an approach similar to that of 
home electric appliance manufacturers. They organized small retail stores 
all around the nation as their “chain stores”: most of  these stores sold 
only some leading manufacturer’s products or at least the majority of their 
sales consisted of those products. Although these stores were mom-and- 
pop stores and therefore had no ownership relation with manufacturers, 
manufacturers supplied various services-for  example, sales clerks. Very 
favorable rebate schemes  were another crucial sales policy used by manufac- 
turers. Table 4.2 illustrates the rebate schedule of one of the leading com- 
panies. The amount of rebate is quite large: up to 15 percent of the order 
price is returned to a retail store when the order exceeds a certain amount. 
Under this type of accelerating nonlinear rebate schedule retail stores have 
strong incentives to sell the products of one particular company. 
7. When Suntory, the fourth-largest beer manufacturer in Japan, entered the beer market, 
it had difficulty finding wholesalers to deal with its products because all beer wholesalers 
were part of the keiretsu network of some incumbent beer manufacturer. 
8. It should be noted that when Matsushita started its production and sales of such home 
electric appliances as TVs and washing machines, it could not find a well-developed distribu- 
tion network for its products. Thus Matsushita constructed its own distribution channels by 
asking small local stores, such as radio repair shops, to become “Matsushita chain stores.” Competition in the Japanese Distribution Market  145 
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Table 4.2  Rebate Scheme Example 
Amount of Procurement per  Rebate 
Month (ten thousand yen)  Rate (%) 
> 500 















Source: Shukan Daiyamondo (Diamond Weekly; Tokyo), 3 July  1993. 
The cases of home electric appliances and cosmetics, where even retail 
stores were organized into keiretsu networks by  manufacturers,  may be 
extreme. However, for many other products, one could observe manufac- 
turers’ keiretsu distribution channels to some extent, and manufacturers 
introduced various measures to support keiretsu networks. 
Among various measures that manufacturers introduced to affect the 
incentives of retail stores and wholesalers, the vertical price structures the 
manufacturers set and the resulting retail margins were the most impor- 
tant tools. By  vertical price structure I mean the relative position in the 
distribution channel of various prices, such as the manufacturer’s sales 
price, the wholesaler’s shipping price and the retail price. In the literature 
on vertical restraint  (see, e.g., Tirole  1988, chap. 4), the importance of 
retail margin as an incentive mechanism is pointed out by many people. 
The manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer relation can be considered one type 
of principal-agent model, where manufacturers are principals and whole- 
salers and retailers are agents. Retail stores and wholesalers as agents sell 
products for manufacturers. Manufacturers set the retail margins of their 
products strategically so that retail stores and wholesalers had incentives 
to sell their products. 
The pharmaceutical  industry is perhaps  where competition in retail 
margins went to the extreme. Table 4.3 shows retail margins for some na- 
tional brand cough medicines when they were sold at the suggested price 
(the data are based on interviews I conducted with retail stores). It should 
be noted that the margins for two products are as high as 60 percent of 
their retail prices, whereas the margins for the other products are around 
40 percent. One can imagine that retail stores had strong incentive to sug- 
gest these two high-margin products to customers. It was said that many 
customers coming to drugstores would ask the store pharmacist for a sug- 
gestion.  Thus  drugstores had  strong influence on consumers’ product 
choices in Japan. 
The manufacturers selling the two products with relatively small retail 146  Motoshige Itoh 
Table 4.3  Retail Margin under Suggested Price for National Brand 
Cough Medicine 
Brand  Retail Margin” (%) 
Benza-ace  40 
Ldu-A  38 
Sutona  60 
Pavlon  64 
Source: Based on author’s interviews. 
*The percentage share of the retail margin in the total sales price. 
margins had established their shares of the market and formed close rela- 
tions with wholesalers before the other two entered. Thus the other two, 
the entrants, decided to sell their products directly to retail stores and 
bypass  the  wholesale system, recognizing the  difficulty of  penetrating 
keiretsu wholesale networks. These two entrants chose to set high retail 
margins in order to give strong incentives for retail stores to sell their 
products. 
Needless to say, a high retail margin always induces discount stores to 
sell at lower prices. The pharmaceutical industry in Japan was no excep- 
tion. However, there were two obstacles for discounters. One was severe 
government regulation of the opening of new drugstores. This regulation 
protected traditional mom-and-pop drugstores and made the expansion 
of  drugstore chains and sale  of  pharmaceuticals  in  large retail  stores 
difficult (these regulations are going to be removed soon). 
Another barrier to discounters was the difficulty of obtaining enough 
product  from  the  manufacturers.  The  many  mom-and-pop  drugstores 
were an important distribution channel for manufacturers. Thus manufac- 
turers did not like their retail margins to shrink due to discounting. So 
manufacturers did not supply enough product to retail stores selling at 
discounted  price^.^ This kind of manufacturer behavior of course violates 
antimonopoly law.  But  there  are many  subtle ways to discourage dis- 
counting behavior without explicitly violating the law. Moreover, the Fair 
Trade Commission in Japan did not regulate this behavior severely. 
So  far, I have been discussing the structure of the traditional Japanese 
distribution system by focusing on small stores. However, even large retail 
stores,  such  as  department  stores  and  general  merchandising  stores 
(GMS), which had a crucial position in the postwar distribution system 
in Japan, followed practices similar to those discussed above. 
To  understand the role of department stores in the traditional Japanese 
distribution system one must note the complementary relation between 
9. Retail stores could obtain some products from other retail stores or from independent 
wholesalers. However, manufacturers  sometimes put  pressure  on  these retail  stores  and 
wholesalers not to sell their products to discounters. Competition in the Japanese Distribution Market  147 
department stores and small retail stores, mentioned above; that is, most 
consumers visited neighborhood shopping zones containing small retail 
stores for daily shopping and larger shopping areas in the centers of large 
cities for occasional shopping for such products as seasonal clothing, fur- 
niture, and some luxury goods. Department stores were in the larger shop- 
ping areas. 
Due to this complementary relation between small shopping areas and 
department stores, department stores dealt with goods that mom-and-pop 
stores did not carry and stocked quite a large variety of goods. Hyukkuten, 
the Japanese expression for a department store, means “the store selling a 
hundred goods”: in Japanese a hundred means a lot. The typical depart- 
ment  store in Japan sold a far wider variety of goods than department 
stores in other industrial countries. 
The size of the department store reflected the size of the city. Depart- 
ment stores in larger cities were much larger than those in smaller cities. 
Department  stores  in  wealthy  neighborhoods  carried  more  expensive 
goods  than  other  department  stores. The  contents  of  the  department 
stores thus varied greatly depending on the characteristics of consumers 
in the neighborhood. It was therefore almost impossible in Japan to run 
department stores as chain operations. Each store was operated quite in- 
dependently. The procurement of goods was not centralized and depended 
heavily on wholesalers and manufacturers, just as in the case of small retail 
stores. A large portion of department store sales were under consignment. 
Under consignment  arrangements, department  stores did not take any 
risk for sales because wholesalers or manufacturers took the risk of unsold 
goods. Prices were also set by wholesalers and manufacturers under con- 
signment. Furthermore, more than half of the sales clerks in department 
stores were employees of wholesalers or manufacturers. As did small retail 
stores, department stores depended heavily on wholesalers and manufac- 
turers. 
GMSs grew  rapidly  during  the  1960s  and  1970s. GMSs,  typically 
smaller in scale than department stores and with smaller customer bases 
were run as chain operations. The relations between GMSs and wholesal- 
ers were not like those between department stores and wholesalers. GMSs 
used their own sales clerks, took their own risks and set prices by them- 
selves. The independent position of GMSs allowed them to be less influ- 
enced by  manufacturers’ market channel controls, and it was often the 
case that these GMSs played a role in changing the traditional distribution 
system.’” However, as will be discussed in the next section, expansion of 
GMS chains has been regulated by the Large Scale Retail Store Law. 
10. The conflict between Matsushita, the largest home electric appliance manufacturer, 
and Daiei, the largest GMS, regarding the pricing policy of  Daiei was famous. Daiei’s dis- 
counting of Matsushita products induced Matsushita to cease selling to Daiei. 148  Motoshige Itoh 
Until the mid-1970s most Japanese consumers did not use automobiles 
for shopping. Most GMSs had their shop outlets near railway stations. 
Although they were chain operated, the Japanese GMSs had many of the 
features of department stores. They sold not only food and sundries but 
also many other goods, such as home electric appliances, apparel, and 
furniture. Compared with a chain store in the United States, the typical 
Japanese GMS sold a much greater variety (though not amount) of goods. 
For example, if one compares Wal-Mart, the largest chain in the United 
States, and Daiei, the largest chain in Japan, in the mid-l990s, the former 
sold about three times as much as the latter in value, while it had about 
ten times the number of the shop outlets. This means that sales per outlet 
for Daiei were about three times as large as for Wal-Mart. If one compares 
a typical Daiei store with a typical Wal-Mart store, one can understand 
why Daiei’s sales per store were far larger than Wal-Mart’s. Daiei carried 
a far greater variety of goods than Wal-Mart, which enabled Daiei to sell 
more in value per store. 
The Japanese-style GMSs, which sold a large variety of goods and as 
a result sold smaller amounts of each item, could not have the level of 
independence that American chain stores enjoy. Japanese chain stores de- 
pended on the services of wholesalers, unlike American chain stores whose 
procurement is far more centralized and who often have their own central- 
ized  distribution centers. Thus, in  spite of  rapid  growth,  the Japanese 
GMSs did not replace the traditional wholesale system; they rather coex- 
isted with the traditional system. 
4.3  Structural Change in the Distribution System 
and the Large Scale Retail Store Law 
The Japanese distribution system started changing rapidly in the mid- 
1980s. The most important driving force behind this change was the mo- 
torization of Japanese society. Although Japan lagged behind other indus- 
trial  nations  in  the  motorization  process, the  number  of  automobiles 
owned by people suddenly started increasing at the end of the 1970s. Many 
people now use automobiles for shopping. They prefer stores with parking 
spaces, and they now can go to stores they could not have reached on 
foot. In large cities the young generation, who are forced to live in subur- 
ban areas due to high land prices in the city centers, shop in stores located 
in the suburbs. In smaller cities and towns where the population is below 
fifty thousand, large shopping centers are often built in the middle of two 
or three of these cities to attract consumers from these cities: in Japan 
where residential land is constrained and the population is dense, a large 
shopping center can attract consumers from more than two neighboring 
towns. Large retail stores responded to this changing environment in the Competition in the Japanese Distribution Market  149 
distribution industry. They opened large stores and shopping centers with 
large parking lots in suburban areas. By  contrast, traditional mom-and- 
pop stores could not adjust to these changes. 
However, there was a big barrier to this change. That was the Large 
Scale Retail Store Law, as well as other regulations on opening new store 
branches. Under the law, the government reconciled regional small store 
owners with large retail stores, concerning the opening of large store out- 
lets in the region. Before a large store could open, there had to be approval 
from local store owners, and the negotiation process was controlled by the 
government under the law. 
This law had several problems. First, it took a long time to complete 
the negotiation process. The length of the negotiation process depended 
on how strongly local shop owners resisted. It was more than usual for 
negotiations to take two to three years. In some cases negotiations took 
ten years. The long negotiation process not only retarded the opening of 
new shop outlets but also increased the cost of such stores. 
Another problem with the law was that as a result of negotiations, the 
large retail store often made concessions regarding the size of the store 
and its opening hours. Store sizes were curtailed and stores were forced to 
close at seven 0’  clock or seven-thirty. In other words large stores were 
regulated in size and business hours. 
Some stores bypassed these regulations by opening stores smaller than 
the size specified in the Large Scale Retail Store Law.  Many “roadside” 
stores followed this strategy and opened smaller stores in the suburbs. 
These stores were obviously smaller than was optimal, and they faced seri- 
ous problems when regulation was relaxed and larger stores entered the 
market. 
Regulation under the Large Scale Retail Store Law  was criticized by 
many people: academics, large retail store owners, and the mass media. 
However, political lobbying by  small shop owners was strong enough to 
retard deregulation. Only when the American government requested abol- 
ishment of the law following the entry of the large U.S. toy chain store, 
Toys ‘‘a”  Us, was reform of the law initiated. 
It should be noted that the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), which was in charge of the law, was not necessarily in a position 
to resist deregulation. In spite of the fact that most in MITI thought dereg- 
ulation necessary, political pressure from small shop owners was strong 
enough to discourage reform of the law. American pressure for deregula- 
tion was actually a good chance to initiate reform. 
The  law  has  been  reformed  twice  since then.  As  a  result  of  these 
changes, the process of negotiation was speeded up and the business hours 
of large stores were extended. The reform of the law apparently hastened 
the structural change in the distribution system. 150  Motoshige Itoh 
In spite of this deregulation it should be emphasized that not all regula- 
tion was removed. Store size is still curtailed and business hours are re- 
stricted. Further deregulation was requested both from inside and outside. 
The case of the law was brought to a panel of the World Trade Organiza- 
tion. Before a decision was made by the panel, the Japanese government 
decided to abolish the law. The decision was made at the end of  1998 to 
abolish the Large Scale Retail Store Law  and introduce a new  law,  the 
Large Scale Retail Store Location Law. 
Under the new  system of the Large Scale Retail Store Location Law, 
store size and opening hours are no longer negotiated between large stores 
and small local stores. However, the new law mandates that the entry of 
new, large retail stores be checked from the viewpoint of their environmen- 
tal effects on their neighbors-including  such effects as traffic congestion 
and noise. Although the new  law is quite different in purpose from the 
old, there is some concern that local retail stores may use the new law as 
an excuse to block the entry of large stores. However,  since the law has 
not yet been enacted as of May 1999, its effect on competitive conditions 
in the distribution system is yet to be seen. 
4.4  Structural Change of the Distribution System and Market Access 
Structural change in the Japanese distribution system triggered by  mo- 
torization and deregulation made market access from abroad far easier 
than before. The rapid increase in the imports of manufactured goods re- 
flected this change. 
Another factor that is important when one discusses changes in market 
access conditions is the yen  appreciation since 1985. The yen-dollar ex- 
change rate appreciated from around 250 yen  per dollar to 100 yen  per 
dollar in the mid-1990s. The yen also appreciated in terms of its real effec- 
tive exchange rate with respect to all currencies. 
Yen appreciation promoted an increase in Japan’s imports. Not only did 
the volume of imports rise, but the share of manufactured good imports 
also rose substantially. The share of manufactured good imports in total 
imports increased from about 30 percent in 1985 to about 60 percent in 
1996. Before 1985 the majority of Japan’s imports were primary goods that 
did not  go through the distribution channels discussed here. But most 
manufactured goods imported did go through the distribution channels. 
The structural change caused by  motorization and deregulation obvi- 
ously encouraged the expansion of imports. But at the same time, import 
expansion as a result of yen  appreciation was a strong driving force for 
structural change in the distribution system. They went hand in hand. 
Large stores and chain-operated stores, which are more independent of 
traditional  distribution channels than  small stores, are eager to import Competition in the Japanese Distribution Market  151 
inexpensive foreign goods. Severe competition among these stores induces 
them to jump to foreign goods. 
It should be noted that the new type of chain-operated stores emerged 
not only in suburban areas but also inside cities, the location of traditional 
retail stores. One of the important features of the Japanese distribution 
system is that many stores are still located inside cities. A large portion of 
the population still lives in urban areas. Although the number of mom- 
and-pop stores is decreasing at a rapid  rate, what Japanese people call 
“convenience stores” are increasing in number rapidly. Most of the con- 
venience stores were transformed from traditional mom-and-pop stores 
through a franchise system: the owners of the stores became members of 
a national franchise system of convenience stores. Under this system even 
small shop owners became less dependent on the traditional wholesale 
system. 
Let me explain the case of Seven-Eleven Japan, the largest convenience 
store chain in  Japan.  This chain  operation  has about  seven thousand 
stores all around the nation as of  1998. Most are run as mom-and-pop 
stores, but most of such services as procurement, pricing, and store man- 
agement assistance are provided by  the franchiser, the central office of 
Seven-Eleven Japan. Each store sells about three thousand items in small 
shops with frequent delivery of products. Some fresh foods are delivered 
three to four times a day. It is obvious that this system cannot use the 
traditional wholesale system, which is vertically segmented among differ- 
ent categories of goods. Thus this chain constructed a new wholesale net- 
work system by  asking some wholesalers to participate. This wholesale 
system was constructed on the initiative of retailers, and the influence of 
manufacturers was weakened substantially. 
Chain-operated stores-small  convenience stores as well as large chain- 
operated stores-face  strong price competition from each other. The situ- 
ation is quite different from when small mom-and-pop stores were serving 
local consumers. Chain-operated stores cover wider regions and thus have 
many competitors. Furthermore, since competition is not among individ- 
ual shop outlets but among chain systems as a whole, price competition 
is much more severe. Under this kind of rigorous price competition retail 
stores have little incentive to follow manufacturers’ suggested prices. Re- 
tail stores now have their own pricing strategies. Due to this change in the 
behavior of retail stores, in some goods such as home electric appliances 
and processed foods, the traditional policy of manufacturers’ suggested 
prices at each vertical stage of distribution has shifted to an “open price 
scheme” under which manufacturers offer no price suggestions and retail 
stores set their own prices freely. 
Another important change in the retail sector is the emergence of many 
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electric appliances, books, and apparel. These retailers have many similar 
chain-operated stores; thus, just  like large chain  stores, these specialty 
chain stores are also relatively independent from traditional wholesale net- 
works. They usually open their store outlets in shopping centers, and the 
number of shopping centers is increasing rapidly following the reform and 
abolishment of the Large Scale Retail Store Law. 
Over all, the changes described above have increased accessibility from 
abroad to the Japanese retail market. Furthermore, increasing competi- 
tion among retail stores as well as weaker control by manufacturers in the 
distribution system provides consumers with a more competitive environ- 
ment. These changes certainly enhance consumer welfare. 
4.5  Concluding Remarks 
The traditional  distribution channel in Japan was characterized  by  a 
large number of small retail stores and wholesalers. The influence manu- 
facturers exerted through keiretsu distribution channels was quite strong 
and made access from abroad difficult. This paper has explained some 
of the important features of keiretsu distribution channels such as rebate 
systems, enclosure of wholesalers and retailers, and high retail margins as 
incentive mechanisms. 
These features of the Japanese distribution system were partly due to 
constrained land, high population density, and a slow motorization pro- 
cess and partly due to various regulations enforced by  the government. 
Although the system was efficient within the traditional economic envi- 
ronment, it is no longer so in the changing economic environment. Fur- 
thermore, the traditional system set high barriers to imports from abroad. 
The distribution system is now,  however, undergoing rapid  structural 
change. Motorization  and the resulting changes in consumer  behavior 
triggered structural change in the distribution system. The emergence of 
new types of retailers accelerated the change, and the competitive environ- 
ment in the distribution system made foreign access to the Japanese im- 
port market far easier. Yen appreciation since the middle of the 1980s also 
contributed to the change. 
Deregulation  of various measures, especially the abolishment  of the 
Large Scale Retail Store Law, arose as an important policy issue for the 
government. It was also regarded as an important trade issue in negotia- 
tions with Japan’s trade partners. Following various stages of deregulation, 
the Large Scale Retail Store Law was finally removed and a new law, the 
Large Scale Retail Store Location Law, was enacted. Since the new law 
has not yet gone into effect, the influence of this system change has yet to 
be seen. However, the increasing degree of competition among retail stores 
and the aggressive entry of foreign firms into the market is expected to 
further improve accessibility to the Japanese market. Competition in the Japanese Distribution Market  153 
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Comment  Thomas Gale Moore 
During my  time on the President’s Council of Economic Advisers I be- 
came familiar with the hypothesized relationship of the distribution sys- 
tem in Japan to imports. The Reagan administration certainly pressured 
the Japanese to change their system. I am glad to learn that they are mak- 
ing progress on opening up their distribution system, particular with the 
gradual liberalization of  their Large Scale Retail Store Law.  Freeing up 
their distribution system and allowing more efficient types of retailing to 
flourish is in the interest of the Japanese consumer. 
I do not believe that it will have much effect on U.S.-Japanese trade. It 
may shift somewhat the composition of trade, but the imbalance between 
exports and imports worldwide is a result of saving and investment bal- 
ance. Japan saves much more than the United States, and a portion of the 
Japanese funds come to the United States as investment. We gain by this, 
but we pay for it with more imports and less exports. The actual trade 
deficit between the United States and Japan is a meaningless number to 
economists, but not to politicians. 
Nevertheless, it is desirable for all that the Japanese economy continue 
to prosper and that its people reap the gain. A more efficient distribution 
system would raise the living standard of the people of that island. That 
might lead them to buy more goods from us, but the effect would probably 
not be large. 
In reading Motoshige Itoh’s enlightening paper, I was unsure that his 
statistics and arguments proved what he alleged was true. For examp!e, 
Itoh cites hlatsushita as having a series of chain stores that feature that 
manufacturer’s products. These are small neighborhood stores. However, 
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Matsushita  faces  competition  from  other  manufacturers.  Department 
stores and general merchandising  stores also  sell electrical appliances. 
Thus, if the system of small shops is so inefficient, how come Matsushita 
employs it and why do these other outlets not bankrupt Matsushita or at 
least put the small stores out of business? 
These small outlets probably provide considerable information to pur- 
chasers about the products. And while a shop owner has a strong incentive 
to push the brand names of the manufacturers that he or she handles, the 
proprietor must keep local customers happy. The merchant cannot sell 
inferior merchandise  or overprice products.  The local store owner and 
salespeople probably live close to most of their patrons and probably know 
them by name. Consequently, the store is likely to be very sensitive to the 
interests of its clientele. The existence of large rebates from manufacturers 
suggests that competition is keen. 
Itoh argues that general merchandising stores sell a greater variety of 
goods than the typical American  chain store. They may,  but I am not 
convinced that his statistics demonstrate that fact. He calculates the aver- 
age sales per shop for the largest chain in Japan, Daiei, and compares that 
to average sales at a typical Wal-Mart. What exchange rate did he use to 
make this conversion, a market rate, purchasing power parity, or what? 
But even if  we  agree that the sales volume is larger in a chain store in 
Japan, it does not follow that the variety of goods is greater. The individual 
items may be more expensive or the volume of sales for any one good may 
be higher. 
As Itoh showed, the system of small retailers grew up in a market where 
consumers walked to local shops, especially in large cities. In the down- 
town part of large U.S. cities, local stores tend to be small because people 
find it more difficult and costly to use cars. As long as the Japanese people 
live in concentrated cities, shops will tend to be small. The Wal-Marts of 
this world are a product of suburbia with land cheap enough that large 
parking areas can be built. Consequently, even if  the Large Scale Retail 
Store Law is totally repealed we would not expect that Japanese retailing 
would look like US. shopping centers. 
As I mentioned earlier, the Large Scale Retail Store Law is being ad- 
justed slowly. Nevertheless, adjustment is taking place. If the Large Scale 
Retail Store Law were repealed, would local government step in to protect 
small retailers? Probably some would: they do in the United States. How- 
ever, in the United States competition for retail dollars limits the willing- 
ness of cities to exclude large retailers. In Palo Alto where I live, one of the 
largest retailers is Fry’s, an electronic and computer store. Many residents 
would like to rid the city of the store, but it brings in too much money. 
Competition among cities does work. 
I am not sure what table 4.1 shows. The data on shops per 1,000 square 
kilometers are meaningless; much of the United States is uninhabited. The Competition in the Japanese Distribution Market  155 
number of shops per 10,000 people in Japan is somewhat higher than any 
other country listed, but as I said, Japan is a very urban country where we 
would expect more small shops. The number of workers per shop is the 
same in France and Japan. The number of employees in wholesale estab- 
lishments is higher in the United States and France and lower in West 
Germany  than  in  Japan.  Are  German  wholesalers  more  efficient  or 
smaller? Are US. wholesalers less efficient or bigger? 
Finally, in the United States about 10 percent of all nonfood and non- 
auto retail sales are mail order. Is there much mail order in Japan? That 
would clearly increase competition. Basically, the evidence that Itoh pre- 
sents suggests that competition is alive and well  in Japan, but that  the 
government has been trying to limit it. 
Comment  Ching-hsi Chang 
In this paper, Motoshige Itoh delineates the distribution system for manu- 
factured products in Japan after World War 11. The distribution market 
before 1970 can be characterized as a vertically separated system in which 
retail stores were controlled mainly by closely related wholesalers and to 
some extent by manufacturers. This structure was due to the characteris- 
tics of the transportation system and restriction by  the government. The 
former included a lag in motorization, convenient public transportation 
systems, and densely populated urban areas. The latter took the form of 
the Large Scale Retail Store Law.  While large retail stores faced severe 
barriers to entry in local markets under the law, the retail sector was domi- 
nated  by  small family-type retail stores serving their  neighbors. Corre- 
sponding to the retail stores, a lot of local wholesalers, each in charge of 
a single product, had strong influence on the retailers. In extreme cases, 
retail stores were enclosed by manufacturers such as Matsushita and Shi- 
seido, who  had  specific counters in department stores where the sales 
clerks were the employees of wholesalers or manufacturers. The measures 
that manufacturers used to control retailers were price discrimination (re- 
bates) based on the amount of orders and order privileges during product 
shortages. Control by  manufacturers was so effective that there was no 
arbitrage to exploit price margins or cheating in price collusion. Only gen- 
eral  merchandising  stores  operated  independently  of  wholesalers  and 
manufacturers. 
Since the mid-l980s, the vertically separated system has gradually been 
dismantled.  In  the  late  1970s, Japan  became  increasingly motorized. 
People were able to shop in stores located in suburban areas. While the 
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Large Scale Retail Store Law still curbed the development of large shop- 
ping centers, the appreciation of the Japanese yen encouraged imports. 
To promote its exports, the United States initiated pressure to liberalize 
Japanese domestic laws. 
The product distribution system is important because gains from divi- 
sion of labor and specialization are only realized through exchange. An 
effective distribution system permits greater  specialization and division 
of labor and consequently higher economic growth. Itoh’s paper on the 
Japanese  distribution  market  is  very  informative.  I  am especially im- 
pressed by similarities between Japan and Taiwan. Taiwan has a similar 
distribution system because some Japanese companies, such as Shiseido, 
introduced their distribution systems to Taiwan with their products. Inter- 
estingly enough, it was also American pressure that helped deregulation 
in Taiwan (see my paper, chap. 7 in this volume). 
I have several questions about this paper, however. First, I would like to 
know whether the vertically separated system before 1970 in Japan was 
the best distribution system or not. The question arises because small re- 
tailers were heavily protected  by  the government under the Large Scale 
Retail Store Law. What would the alternatives have been had there not 
been such a law? Second, the vertically separated system does not seem to 
be necessary for affiliations with small retail stores because close relations 
between wholesalers and retailers also prevailed in the department store 
system. In other words, a few large nationwide wholesalers could have 
been associated with many  small retail  stores. There is  a fundamental 
question  about the meaning of  the separated  system. Is it  a  product- 
separated or brand-separated distribution system? Since many goods go 
through long tunnels of wholesalers, and either wholesalers or manufac- 
turers control the tunnels, it must be a brand-separated system. However, 
if people have to shop on foot, would it not be more advantageous to sell 
as many brands as possible in one store? On the other hand, it is not 
necessary for retail stores to be small under a brand-separated system be- 
cause they could sell many products, each a single brand, in one retail 
store. 